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Instructions on File

ODP 1486-77
28 July 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.
Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT : SAFE/ADISS Joint Project Office

REFERENCE : Memo fm D/ODP to A/DDA dtd 19 Jul 77, same
subject (ODP 1424-77, DD/A 77-4123)

1. This is in response to your question regarding the DIA revision of the draft study on above subject.

2. Contrary to the initial senior-level DIA reaction to the draft study paper, DIA has chosen to not significantly change the original draft. We are now working with them on their suggested changes, none of which are basically objectionable to us. Basically, they want to go through a one year transitional phase before setting up the joint project office. This would consist of establishing a joint coordinating committee that would serve as an interface between the two agencies while their requirements are being pinned down more precisely. We have doubts whether this interim step will be acceptable to the DCI, but we don't object to it. A senior steering or policy committee (DDI level) would be established at once to oversee the coordinating committee and the eventual joint project office.

3. We see no problem in meeting the 2 August deadline for forwarding a working-level agreed paper to the IC Staff. However, we are still concerned that no senior-level CIA agreement has been obtained on this paper. I hope this is resolved at the scheduled SAFE Steering Group meeting. The DDI apparently feels that the SAFE funding problem probably means the end of the program - so why worry about a joint project office. I do not share these views. SAFE and ADISS have

had so much visibility in Congress, OMB, PRC, ICS, and even in the President's office, that I do not think it can be turned off that easily. If we allow it to wither on the vine at this stage, I believe it will be interpreted as a move to avoid a joint project.

STATINTL



Clifford W. May, Jr.

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File: DDA

(cc in SAFE)

ODP 1424-77

19 JUL 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : Clifford D. May, Jr.
Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT : SAFE/ADISS Joint Project Office

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1. Attached for your information is a report on the study of the establishment of a SAFE/ADISS joint project office prepared by a CIA/DIA task force headed by [REDACTED] DD/OCR. [REDACTED] was our representative on the task force. This study stemmed from certain IC Staff recommendations to the DCI which were approved by him.

2. The attached study proposes a jointly manned (CIA and DIA people) project office sitting in CIA for house-keeping and reporting to the DDI. The staff would be formed from the SAFE group in CIA and the ADISS group in DIA. All funds for the joint project would be in CIA's budget. A senior steering committee, consisting of the DDI, the Director of DIA, and the DDCI/IC, would oversee the project.

3. Presently, this draft study report has run into opposition in the form of a new Admiral in DIA. He is having the paper revised to examine about seven alternatives. We are waiting for the DIA paper before taking the next step.

4. I have some basic problems with this paper, but I am standing down until I see the DIA revisions. Basically, my objections are twofold:

a. I think that the joint project office should confine its interests to policy matters, planning what should be done and who should do it, and tasking the organizations that actually manage the contractors who are developing hardware and software. I think the joint project office should not manage contractors because it will be too busy dealing with policy and pie-slicing issues.

b. I do not think that ODP should be cut out of the picture because we have the best Agency knowhow in managing the development and implementation of large hardware/software systems.

5. If you have any guidance on these issues, I would appreciate your comments. As visualized by D/OCR and DD/OCR, ODP and DDA would be cut out of any project-related role in CIA. Considering the heartburn that SAFE has given us, this might not be a bad idea. But, if we are to be the Agency's central ADP organization, it does not make sense to leave us out. I believe that the joint project office should decide what part of the development work CIA should do and what part DIA should do. ODP would be the implementing office in CIA to carry out tasks levied on CIA by the joint project office.

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6. Finally, the schedule for completing this study is rather tight. It should be in final by 26 July. It should be submitted to the IC Staff - presumably with CIA and DIA concurrence - on 2 August. On 8 August the [REDACTED] report is due, and the IC Staff will determine whether anything in the [REDACTED] report is at variance with the recommendations in this study. On 18 August the study will go to the DCI.

STATINTL

/S/
Clifford D. May, Jr.

Att: a/s

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DRAFT

STAFF STUDY

I. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

A. How to establish a joint project office for CIA's SAFE and DIA's ADISS systems. The objective of any joint project office will be to maximize savings through common development and procurement while at the same time satisfying both CIA and DIA users' requirements.

B. This staff study outlines an organizational structure to meet these objectives and discusses management control, staffing, budgetary and fiscal, and general housekeeping procedures. The study also addresses the handling of CIA/DIA requirements, the system design and development approach and major milestones. The implications of such an organization on the two separate systems are also briefly discussed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. CIA's Safe System

1. In 1972, the DCI approved the initiation of a set of tasks directed toward providing CIA's analysts with the most "effective mix" of central files and special purpose files. Preliminary work with the various CIA analytical offices identified a strong requirement for a series of computer-driven functions that would enable an analyst to view his daily mail on-line, to route items to other offices or individuals, to build and query special analytical files and to have direct on-line access to full-text intelligence message files, a centralized index, and other Community and commercial data bases. Using these requirements, an Office of Central Reference (OCR) project team defined, built and tested a pilot system with many of these capabilities and implemented it in four branches in CIA production offices. Results from this test were reported on in late 1974 and reviewed by the DCI and an independent task team of industry and academic specialists. Based on these findings, the DCI approved development of an Agency-wide SAFE system. The original test system continues on a slightly expanded basis as the "SAFE Interim System." After the SAFE system go ahead was approved by the DCI, briefings on its concepts and the Interim System were provided to Intelligence Community and DoD personnel.

2. During 1975-76 requirements were formalized with heavy user participation and a project team was formed to develop and implement the system for the Directorate of Intelligence in CIA's Office of Data Processing (ODP). Initial SAFE funding was approved for FY 1977.

3. The objective of SAFE is to provide CIA's Directorate of Intelligence analysts with the direct support of data processing technology in order to make the intelligence product better and more timely and to enable these personnel to handle a workload growing in both volume and complexity. The system will do this by providing a series of computer functions for disseminating, scanning, searching, filing, routing, and analyzing information stored in machine and microform storage and for composing and editing finished intelligence at an individual analyst's workstation.

4. CIA currently has study and support contracts outstanding and proposals in-house for a design competition phase.

B. DIA's ADISS System

1. DIA's ADISS effort has evolved from several separate DIA information system planning efforts--in particular, DIAOLS which has been operational since 1969. ADISS will replace DIAOLS, support distributed intelligence production, provide general-purpose data base functions, interconnect to other DoD and non-DoD systems and support analysts and consumers world-wide.

2. ADISS' purpose is to rationalize the entire DIA information system environment by providing a unified system to meet all DIA's information handling needs through the next decade. ADISS' objective is to provide a cost effective integration of DIA subsystems.

3. DIA is currently selecting a contractor for the ADISS System Definition Study.

C. Commonality Question

1. The Congressional Conference Report on the FY 1977 budget for the two agencies recommended coordinated SAFE/ADISS developmental efforts to achieve "maximum commonality" and hence cost savings. In response to this Congressional directive, project officers from the two systems met initially in October 1976 and arranged for briefings and an exchange of system documentation to determine the real potential of any cost savings. These meetings continued throughout the remainder of 1976 and into 1977 as the two agencies worked on identifying areas that were common to the two systems. Since both projects were in their initial stages, only general areas of potential savings were identified. An interim management plan was completed in February 1977 and revised in May 1977. The plan provides for joint CIA/DIA participation in procurement and joint identification of common developmental modules. The plan, however, is based on the concept of two distinct project offices managing two separate, but related, systems.

2. On 8 April 1977, the DCI requested D/DCI/IC to develop a simple statement of the specific differences in the requirements of SAFE and ADISS and to formulate a plan for merging the two systems into one. In responding to this requirement, the D/DCI/IC on 25 May 1977 recommended:

a. DIA complete its ADISS System Definition Study originally scheduled for September 1978 but a 1 January 1978 date was recommended.

b. CIA continue its SAFE Design and Analysis Studies but defer any SAFE-peculiar hardware/software acquisition until a configuration option is made.

c. An independent contractor be retained to make a thorough appraisal of SAFE and ADISS current documentation.

d. A DCI SAFE/ADISS Working Group be established to ensure that CIA and DIA are moving ahead on common concepts, to prepare a staff study on how to establish a joint project office, to monitor the external contractor for the DCI and to establish SAFE/ADISS Project Formal Review Milestones.

The DCI approved these recommendations on 9 June 1977.

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D. Contractual SAFE/ADISS Commonality Study

1. On 8 June 1977 a contract was awarded to [REDACTED] to assess the commonality of the SAFE and ADISS systems. This study is to (a) identify the areas and degree of commonality between the SAFE and ADISS systems, (b) develop the advantages to be derived from achieving this commonality, and (c) recommend management and technical procedures to be applied in implementing commonality objectives.

2. The contract provides for an oral presentation of the findings within 60 days (8 August) and a final written report within 90 days (8 September).

E. SAFE/ADISS Working Group

1. On 23 June 1977 under the chairmanship of the IC Staff, a SAFE/ADISS Working Group of CIA, DIA and NSA was established to prepare a staff study on how to establish a joint ADISS/SAFE project office.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Management Options

1. There are numerous management options that could be utilized to create a joint project office. Most of these options, however, are variations on three basic concepts: executive agent; a jointly staffed office similar to but not necessarily the same as the current NPIC; or an IC Staff office.

2. In determining the criteria that should be present within the best organizational structure, we opted for those that would provide clear and clean lines of authority and strong overall direction. We felt that this was critical because the daily problems that surface in any major system development will be complicated by many additional ones that will arise in designing a system(s) to serve two or more agencies. Any organizational structure involving multiple reporting, direction and command channels will have extreme difficulty in controlling the contractor(s), testing the system and phasing the system into service.

3. We considered, but discarded a management structure in which one agency of the Intelligence Community would act as the executive agent for the Project. Under any combination based on this concept, we felt there would be communication problems and considerable adjudication and review requirements. There would be no opportunity for dual agency employee participation in the project but most importantly the user requirements of the outside agencies could be diminished or distorted resulting in a system that did not meet user requirements. The outside agencies because they did not participate in system development could claim the resultant system was not a Community system but one merely developed by the executive agent.

4. We also considered, but discarded, a DCI/IC Staff office structure charged with developing the SAFE/ADISS system perhaps as the beginning of a new Community office that would eventually extend its jurisdiction to all Community ADP and telecommunications management and planning. We felt that this approach would be too costly in new staffing and other overhead requirements, too great a risk to an analytical support system to have its original development under the control of a new organization, too great a risk also to the user requirements within both agencies because such an organization would quickly become remote from the "real analytical world" and lastly there would be no dual agency participation.

5. The management structure that meets most of our criteria and one that offers, we feel, the greatest success for developing and implementing a SAFE/ADISS system is a structure jointly staffed by the two agencies but located within, subject to, and using the administrative facilities of one of the two agencies. This staff study describes how such a joint project office could be formed and how it would operate. It does not cover all the administrative details and specifications of such a structure. These would be developed jointly with the two agencies by the manager selected to head the joint project office.

B. Organization of Joint Project Office

1. A joint project office could be created by a memorandum of understanding between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This memorandum would spell out the objectives of the office; staffing, budgetary and fiscal arrangements; and how the system would be developed within the project structure. The memorandum would locate the office in CIA for "rations and quarters" and would make the Deputy Director of Intelligence (DDI) responsible for the overall direction of the project. The project office Chief would be either a senior CIA or DIA official and his deputy would be from the opposite agency. Supervisory positions in subordinate organizations within the project office would be shared equally by DIA and CIA employees. The chief and deputy chief of the joint project office would be selected by the DDI and the Director, DIA with the approval of the DCI.

2. Staffing--The project office staff could be created from the current CIA/SAFE staffs in OCR and ODP and the DIA/ADISS current and planned staff. We estimate that 45 positions shared by the two agencies would be required for staffing the project office. The number, however, may increase or decrease dependent upon the responsibilities of the project office as defined in the memorandum of understanding. Most of the staffing details would be spelled out in this memorandum of understanding. The following general guidelines are recommended:

a. DIA personnel would be assigned on a non-reimbursable basis; CIA, however, would pay all official travel, training, and related expenses in connection with the assignment.

b. Personnel assigned to the project office, other than contract personnel and consultants, would be acquired from within each agency. Outside hires would be authorized only after each agency has certified that no qualified personnel are available.

c. Contract personnel would be hired in accordance with CIA regulations and procedures.

d. The chief and deputy chief of the project office would decide the suitability of the individuals nominated by each agency for the project and could request a replacement if an individual is not performing.


e. Performance appraisals would be prepared by the appropriate project office supervisor. Copies of the appraisal forms on DIA employees will be forwarded to DIA as would all training completed certificates and similar documents.

f. Generally, personnel and security regulations of CIA would be followed but these could be modified in negotiation with DIA.

3. Management and Control--The ADISS/SAFE development would be carried out as a joint project. The system would be defined, designed, developed, and brought to operation under the Joint Analytical Support Project Office (JASPO). JASPO would receive overall direction from CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) but the DDI would work closely on all activities of the joint development effort with the Director, DIA and the D/DCI/IC. These three senior individuals would constitute the JASPO Steering Committee, chaired by the DDI. Status and work direction would be reviewed periodically by the JASPO Steering Committee and all final requirements and external specifications at the system level would be approved by the Steering Committee. These approved requirements and specifications would then constitute the mutual agreement on the system to be developed. A proposed JASPO organization chart is given in figure 1.

4. Budget and Fiscal--With the exception of the salaries paid by DIA for its employees detailed to JASPO, all funds for the joint project development would be included in the ODDI/CIA budget. The Chief of JASPO would be responsible for preparing the budget and budgetary justifications; budgetary and fiscal review would be done by the Steering Committee. ODDI/CIA would budget for the CIA staff personnel assigned to JASPO; DIA/RCC would budget for the DIA staff personnel assigned to JASPO. Contracts would be let in accordance with CIA procedures and regulations and would be reported both as elements of task cost and as individual line items. The approval authority for fund expenditures would be the DDI. Authorized FY 1978 funds for ADISS would be transferred to ODDI/CIA and merged with the SAFE FY 1978 funds to consolidate the FY 1978 budget. A revised FY 1979 Funding Program would be prepared by JASPO for submission to OMB and Congress.

Figure 1: Proposed Organizational Structure for JASPO



5. Housekeeping--CIA would furnish space, furniture, communications, and other administrative support for JASPO. JASPO would utilize CIA procurement channels and be subject to CIA fiscal controls and authority. The first requirement of the Chief, JASPO would be to prepare a detailed Project Management Plan for approval of the JASPO Steering Committee. This plan would cover, but not necessarily be limited to, the management approach, organization, fiscal, contract, study methodology, reviews and reporting, relationships with industry, etc.

C. DIA and CIA User Requirements

1. SAFE and ADISS were both conceived with extensive user participation in identifying the analytical support requirements that each system was to provide. It is essential that the thrust of these requirements are preserved and met in any system developed by JASPO. If JASPO fails in this important role, the resultant system would be of little value to the analyst. Furthermore, any fiscal savings resulting from joint development would be of no consequence because the system would not be utilized by the analysts and the caliber of overall intelligence production would suffer. The users in both agencies must, therefore, be well represented in any joint development.

2. JASPO must be sensitive to the user requirements of both agencies. Since some tradeoffs will be necessary in any joint development, it is essential that JASPO develop procedures to ensure that users are consulted regularly and that they have a responsive appeal route whenever design changes are made for reasons of feasibility or cost. Since it will be inevitable that some requirements of both agencies may not be met in certain trade-off situations, the appeal/reclama procedures in any joint development effort must be clear and efficient. These procedures should be explicitly spelled out in the JASPO management plan. JASPO may want to consider forming an adhoc interagency user council to work with its requirements staff to ensure timely and judicious processing of major design tradeoffs. An interagency user council would be an effective device for ensuring that users' views are heard. Their input could be footnoted to formally record the decision impact for the JASPO Steering Committee.

3. To ensure that the user requirements represent that agency, all user requirements would have to be validated by that agency. Conflicting requirements that emerge from the design specification efforts for which no accommodation could be made within the feasibility or cost threshold would be reviewed (by the adhoc user council) before the requirements are referred for final action to the JASPO Steering Committee.

4. A consolidated record of unsatisfied requirements would be maintained by JASPO and published on a regular basis (for the interagency user council). This procedure would ensure that system users are notified, far in advance, of system limitations and are able to adjust appropriately.

5. When user requirements of either agency conflict on procedural or interface standards, the affected agency would prepare the waiver request. Major deviations from DoD or CIA interface standards would be approved by the JASPO Steering Committee prior to waiver action and implementation. A typical example might be a Defense Standard requiring the utilization of standard telecommunications protocols throughout DoD digital communications networks. A waiver of this standard for a DIA analytical support system would be approved by the JASPO Steering Committee prior to submission to the Secretary of Defense for final decision.

6. CIA currently has quantified requirements for its SAFE system approved and well documented in the SAFE Functional Requirements Document (SAF-DO01D/77).

7. DIA currently has specified requirements plus a set of general requirements. For example, there is a requirement to replace DIAOLS with a system providing a greater capacity (specified) but there are also requirements to address the information processing needs of DIA (general). Both of these types are outlined in DIA's ADISS Plan dated 10 June 1977.

8. Both SAFE and ADISS are directed toward the objective of providing information handling capabilities to CIA analysts and to DIA analysts and consumers. The joint system to be designed by JASPO cannot serve alone as a Community information handling system without radically changing the original purposes of SAFE and ADISS and adding substantial costs to the joint system. The analytical support system that would be developed by the joint office, however, could serve as one of the elements of a Community-wide system yet to be defined and developed.

D. System Design and Development

1. Under a joint development effort, JASPO would be responsible for consolidating characteristics and needs of the joint system and would contract for its design and development. JASPO would monitor the contract, conduct in-progress reviews, develop testing and reliability programs, verify the system architecture, and conduct final government acceptance tests for both agencies. The joint office would then be phased out as the system's final operational capability is achieved in CIA and DIA.

2. Some consideration might be given to maintaining JASPO as a permanent project office for the two agencies to handle the analytical support system's enhancements or modifications. This provision, however, should be spelled out in the memorandum of understanding and the joint management plan.

3. Phased development of the joint system appears to be the best approach, that is, elements can be brought to service as developed rather than as one large delivery and cut-over. This phased development would permit orderly transition by function. It would require, however, a modular design to ensure manageable sizing of developmental tasks.

4. The ultimate supporting hardware configuration may be physically centralized serving both agencies or distributed dependent upon functional requirements, costs, and operational considerations. Some interface to other Community systems will be necessary and this should be spelled out in greater detail in the final specifications. If the system is to meet its primary objective of supporting production analysts, interfaces must be generalized and should provide both security and loading protection in accordance with the type of analytical file, the data and security restrictions.

5. Documentation would follow a common standard. JASPO would review and evaluate DoD and CIA standards and select one for all analysis and design documentation.

6. Contract deliverables will be reviewed by JASPO and within each agency (and by the adhoc interagency council) when verification or validation is required by the user constituency.

E. Status of On-Going Programs

1. The ADISS System Definition Study scheduled to be awarded in August 1977 and the SAFE Design Competition contract award scheduled for September 1977 should continue as planned during the formation of JASPO. After JASPO is created, it would assume the responsibility for both contractual efforts and, if required, would make the necessary contractual modifications for joint project development. These two contracts for analysis and design will focus upon the commonality issue. The DIA contract will be managed by DIA personnel who will be assigned to JASPO. CIA membership on this DIA team should be provided as the initial step of the joint staff merger. In a similar manner, a DIA employee from the ADISS technical staff will be on the team managing the CIA design competition. Any subsequent contractual efforts before JASPO is formed would consist of combined DIA and CIA personnel reflecting

the joint development. Under this arrangement, both ADISS and SAFE goals can be pursued (within the joint development mode) but without any interruption while the memorandum of understanding and the joint management and logistical plans are completed and JASPO activated. Continuing these contracts as scheduled also prevents a one year delay that would occur by the re-initiation of the procurement phase for both contracts.

2. In the interim period before JASPO is established, CIA and DIA personnel will continue their participation in each agency's source selection and project review processes as outlined in the interim joint management plan agreed to by the two agencies (SAF-A002A/77, 1 June 1977).

F. Major Milestones

Award DIA ADISS Study Definition Contract	August 1977
Award CIA Design Competition Contract	September 1977
IC Staff Initiate Preparation and Negotiations of JASPO Memorandum of Understanding	1 September 1977
Complete JASPO Memorandum of Understanding	1 November 1977
Establish JASPO Planning Staff	15 November 1977
Complete Management and Logistical Plans for the Project (JASPO Planning Staff)*	15 January 1978
Consolidate ADISS/PMO and SAFE/PMO into JASPO	1 February 1978

*Project Milestones would be established in the Joint Management Plan.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

A. It is possible to create a joint project office for CIA's SAFE and DIA's ADISS systems by a memorandum of understanding between the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

B. There are several management options for a project office. A jointly staffed office located in one of the two agencies for "rations and quarters" is the soundest of all the available options for combined project management. Any joint ADISS/SAFE system could be defined, designed, developed and brought into operation by this joint project management office.

C. Major concerns with this proposed organizational structure are:

1. One agency might be in a position to exert more influence over the project than the other.

2. The combined project office would be confronted with more complex technical and management problems than those confronted by individual project offices located in each agency.

3. A joint project office would be more remote from the users for whom the SAFE and ADISS systems are being developed. It will require an intensive effort by the joint project office and by the two agencies to ensure that these user requirements are not distorted.

4. A joint project development will encounter significant technical problems resulting from DoD-wide interface requirements incumbent upon ADISS.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. It is recommended that a Joint Analytical Support Project Office (JASPO) be established within CIA by a memorandum of understanding signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI; JASPO to be staffed by personnel from both agencies and charged with defining, designing, developing and bringing to operational readiness a joint analytical support system for CIA and DIA analysts embodying SAFE and ADISS concepts. It is further recommended that:

1. JASPO be under the direct supervision of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence and all funds for the joint project development, except for the salaries of DIA employees assigned to JASPO, be assigned to the O/DDI/CIA budget.

2. The chief and deputy chief of JASPO be selected by the Director, DIA and Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA with the approval of the DCI and that they both not be from the same agency.

3. The staff for JASPO be created from the current CIA/SAFE staff and the DIA/ADISS current and planned staff.

4. Oversight of the joint project development be exercised by a JASPO Steering Committee comprised of CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Director of DIA and the D/DCI/IC. The Steering Committee to be chaired by the DDI.

5. CIA furnish space, furniture, communications and all other administrative support for JASPO. JASPO to be authorized to utilize CIA procurement channels and be subject to CIA fiscal controls and authority.

6. The current work being contracted on SAFE and ADISS be continued as scheduled and combined into JASPO when it is formed.

B. The above recommendations be implemented in accordance with the proposed milestones presented in Section III, F of this staff study.

APPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DISAPPROVED: _____
Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: _____